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In response to Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009).
Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboros, for the wrongful death (from lung cancer) of her husband Jesse,
1
who had been a lifelong Marlboro smoker. Despite warnings from
the federal government, family, and many others, Jesse Williams had
smoked because he allegedly believed Philip Morris’s claims that
2
smoking had not been proven to be dangerous. An Oregon jury
awarded Ms. Williams $821,000 in compensatory damages (reduced to
$521,000 because of a cap on pain and suffering) and $79.5 million in
punitive damages (of which sixty percent was diverted to the Oregon
3 4
government ). The punitive award was upheld by Oregon’s appellate
courts and was reaffirmed on remand after the United States Supreme
Court ordered it to be reconsidered in light of the Court’s ruling in
5
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. The Oregon
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1
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub
nom. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
2
Id. at 829.
3
See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2007) (directing sixty percent of all punitive damage awards into the “Criminal Injuries Compensation Account”).
4
Williams, 48 P.3d at 828.
5
Williams, 540 U.S. at 801 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408 (2003)).
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Supreme Court upheld the award under Campbell because Philip Mor6
ris’s behavior was “extraordinarily reprehensible.”
A sharply divided United States Supreme Court reversed, finding
that the punitive damages award against Philip Morris violated the
7
company’s constitutional right to due process. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion ruled for the first time that a factfinder must be instructed
that it may not increase punitive damages because of harm caused to
8
nonparties to a lawsuit. Such harm is, Breyer conceded, relevant to
the availability of punitive damages but may play no role in determin9
ing the amount of a punitive award. The majority declined to consider a separate question—whether the one-hundred-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory awards in Williams flouted the constitutional
standards of BMW of North America v. Gore—presumably because it ex10
pected the quantum to be reduced on remand.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
noted that Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction—the rejection of
which was the basis for its appeal—itself approved consideration of
harm suffered by nonparties, and that, therefore, the majority’s ruling
11
did not respect the case’s procedural posture. Justice Thomas, aghast at yet another use of substantive due process, concluded that the
Court’s jurisprudence on punitive damages “is ‘insusceptible of prin12
cipled application.’” Justice Stevens, writing separately, agreed with
Justice Ginsburg that the defendant’s appeal precluded the majority’s
ruling and added that he saw “no reason why an interest in punishing
a wrongdoer ‘for harming persons who are not before the court’
should not be taken into consideration when assessing the appropri13
ate sanction for reprehensible conduct.”
I have long believed that the most coherent federal-constitutional
justification for judicial control of state punitive damages awards is the
14
Eighth Amendment’s “excessive fines” clause.
Unfortunately, this
6

Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177, 1181-82 (Or. 2006), vacated
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
7
Williams, 549 U.S. at 353-55.
8
Id. at 355.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 352 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
11
Id. at 362-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
13
Id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 349 (majority opinion)).
14
See Michael I. Krauss, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court: A Tragedy in Five
Acts, ENGAGE, Oct. 2003, at 118, 119-20.
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view was rejected by a majority of the Court in Browning-Ferris Industries
15
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. In an interesting footnote to his
Williams dissent, however, Justice Stevens returned to the Eighth
16
Amendment.
In any case, after Williams, judges must tell jurors to think about
harm to nonparties in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct merits a punitive award. But then jurors cannot think about that harm
when determining the amount of punitive damages; to calculate punitive damages they must somehow consider only the harm to the plaintiff. How jurors are to clear their minds between these two steps is
unclear—what is clear is that this issue will be back before the Court.
My own view is that awards of punitive damages almost always violate a key characteristic of tort law by breaching the private ordering/public ordering divide. If I am correct, the role Professor Dan
Markel reserves for punitive damages is incompatible with tort law’s
nature. I wish to first summarize that view and then comment on “micro” aspects of Markel’s interesting paper.
I. PUBLIC ORDERING VS. PRIVATE ORDERING
Political legal philosophers conventionally distinguish between
aspects of law that regulate private ordering and aspects of law that re17
gulate public ordering. Private ordering is between citizens. Property law,
contract law, tort law, and family law exist to regulate this ordering. Public ordering is between citizens and the State. Criminal law, administrative law, tax law, and welfare law are components of public ordering.
Public ordering is the only kind of legal order in totalitarian societies. In such a society there is no such thing as property as Americans
experience it. Nor is there freedom of contract between consenting
adults—private contracts would allow self-determination without state
supervision and would thus be impermissible. Importantly, to the extent it is totalitarian, a state can have no tort law: there’s no such
thing as a private wrong because every wrong is a wrong against the state.
On the other hand, tort law is an essential component of private
ordering. It is contract law’s necessary counterpart—regulating non15

492 U.S. 257 (1989).
See Williams, 549 U.S. at 360 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I continue to agree
with . . . those scholars who have concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to punitive damages awards regardless of who receives the ultimate payout.”). Indeed, the fact that most of the punitive award in this case accrued to the state makes
the analogy to a fine even stronger than in Browning-Ferris.
17
See generally Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
623 (1991).
16
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contractual interaction among humans. This rectification of private
imbalances takes place without the intervention of prisons and police,
quintessential components of public ordering. As part of private ordering, tort law has the several implications.
First, without a wrong, there is no imbalance requiring private redress. An efficient businessman who through acceptable techniques
outcompetes his competitor owes the latter nothing. The causing of a
loss incurs no tort liability; rather, it is the wrongful causing of a loss
18
that creates the requirement of compensation.
Similarly, wrongful behavior without damages creates no corrective justice duty. Driving home while drunk is negligent (wrongful)
and may garner public outrage, but if a drunk makes it home without
hitting anyone, she has no tort liability. Her crime is a matter for public ordering, which carries with it all of the protections to which an
individual is entitled when the might of the state is directed against
her. It is the conjunction of wrongfulness and the harm caused the19
reby that creates the tort obligation.
20
Finally, when a tort occurs, compensation must be full. Compensation is a function of damages wrongfully incurred rather than
that of the extent of wrongdoing. A tortfeasor who negligently burns
down a $50,000 house is liable in tort to pay $50,000 to make the
homeowner whole. If that house was worth $1 million, she would
likewise be required to pay $1 million to its owner. This is not because
tort law favors the rich, but because tort equally respects the poor and
the rich. Each tort victim has the right to be returned to her former
state by the tortfeasor who wrongfully harmed her—that far but no
farther. Similarly, rich tortfeasors owe full compensation, as do poor

18

This is of course Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice as first sketched in
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5, ch. 4, at 120-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
For a modern description, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83
(1995). Corrective justice theory is so orthodox that jurists who depart from it are
noteworthy. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation:
Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2037 (1997) (contrasting Judge Weinstein’s
jurisprudence to “the traditional measure of relief—full compensation—as the norm
of justice in mass tort cases”).
19
See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
407 (1987).
20
See Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 32-39), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272678 (applying this principle to misguided tort reform
efforts to reduce recovery through the abolition of the collateral source rule).
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21

tortfeasors. Public law may distinguish in many ways between the rich
and the poor (e.g., with regard to “progressive” income tax rates or criminal sentencing guidelines), but private law is properly blind to wealth.
Punitive damages as currently understood do not fit into this
scheme of tort law because, by definition, punitive damages are overcompensatory. Nevertheless, a different conception of punitive damages was present at the conception of tort law. Under that conception
punitive damages continue to have a legitimate but extremely limited
role in tort.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES’ HISTORICALLY LIMITED ROLE
England’s common law courts first awarded punitive damages in
the eighteenth century at a time when the institutional structure of
22
criminal law enforcement was quite primitive. Plaintiffs invariably
served as private attorneys general and collected “penalties.” In fact,
quite a few such “punitive” damage awards were in reality compensatory. As Judge Richard Posner explains in Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging, Inc.,
An example is deliberately spitting in a person’s face, a criminal assault
but because minor readily deterrable by the levying of what amounts to a
civil fine through a suit for damages for the tort of battery. Compensatory damages would not do the trick in such a case, and this for three
reasons: because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that
inflict largely dignitary harms; because in the spitting case they would be
too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue, and he might decide instead to respond with violence—and an age-old purpose of the law of
torts is to provide a substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury—and because to limit the plaintiff to compensatory damages would
enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity provided that he was willing to pay, and again there would be a danger that
23
his act would incite a breach of the peace by his victim.

The premise for Judge Posner’s observation may be the fact that
tort law provided no subjective damages (damages for the outrage to
one’s dignity) to victims of dignitary harms who suffered no neurolog-

21

Of course, if the tortfeasor is so poor that he has insufficient assets to compensate the victim (and insufficient insurance to make him solvent), then he cannot be
adequately reached in tort.
22
See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982) (tracing the origins of punitive damages in AngloAmerican law).
23
Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2003).
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24

ical pain. “Punitive” damages in these dignitary cases were not punitive at all. They remedied a loophole in tort law in cases where dam25
ages were grossly undercompensatory.
An excellent contemporary illustration of this function for punitive damages is the aforementioned Seventh Circuit decision, Mathias
26
v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. In Mathias, a motel knowingly rented
rooms infested with bed bugs while fumigation took place, instead of
27
closing down for a few days and losing rental income. The plaintiffs,
who were bitten, claimed that the defendant was guilty of “willful and
wanton conduct,” making it liable for punitive damages under Illinois
28
law. The jury agreed and, although it granted only $5000 in com29
pensatory damages, awarded $186,000 in punitive damages.
The
plaintiffs’ emotional distress was arguably substantial, but that distress
30
could not be the object of compensatory damages. In reality, the
punitive award was compensatory. Indeed, American common law’s
lack of a “loser pays” rule ensures undercompensation of the wrongfully injured. As Judge Posner noted in Mathias, the “American rule”
enables strategic behavior by wealthy and culpable defendants:
[A wealthy defendant can] mount an extremely aggressive defense
against suits such as this and by doing so . . . make litigating against it
very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a
lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as it does only modest
31
stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee.

Today, we have paid attorneys general and local prosecutors, and
fines are collected in public ordering settings. Indeed, today we have
criminal offenses where in the past public ordering would never have

24

See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393 (2009) (“[N]ineteenth-century tort law . . . refus[ed] to recognize claims mainly pursued by women, such as those for emotional distress.”).
25
Cf. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 40-58 (1990) (identifying situations when punitive damages
could be used to reach efficient results).
26
347 F.3d 672.
27
Id. at 674.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Will the plaintiffs ever again enjoy sleeping in hotel rooms or ever sleep soundly
in such rooms again?
31
Id. at 677.
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32

been involved. In addition to tort damages, the hotel in Mathias was
subject to both criminal prosecution and a regulatory “death penal33
ty”—the removal of its permit to operate a hotel.
The prosecution of criminal offenses, however, is subject to constitutional protections, including Fifth Amendment protection against
34
self-incrimination and double jeopardy, Eighth Amendment protec35
tion against excessive fines, and the Article I prohibition of ex post
facto laws subjecting individuals to federal prosecution for crimes not
36
previously clearly defined. A tort trial today offers none of those protections: compulsory discovery compels self-incrimination, one tort
may lead to many successful lawsuits, and the grounds for liability may
37
be utterly unknown before judgment. Extension of punitive damages beyond the rectification of “tort loopholes” would, therefore, be an
abuse of the current public/private divide.
Such abuse occurs when punitive damages are sought in noncompensatory settings, but it also occurs in other areas of the law. “Civil
penalties” sought by the state for having one’s car photographed by a
speed camera allow for prosecution without due process (the state
need not prove that the speeder is the defendant) and are a mockery
of the criminal burden of proof (the defendant cannot recall the context of the speeding to justify it, since he is notified of the photo only
weeks later; and he must identify anyone else driving his car in order
38
to avoid liability). Similarly, efforts by states to exact criminal punishment without jury trial through civil contempt proceedings have
been properly repressed by the Supreme Court as intruding on public
39
ordering. Implementation of public policy through punitive damages awards similarly awaits satisfactory Supreme Court remedy.

32

See, e.g., HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET
(2009) (describing overlegislation and overenforcement of public offenses at the federal level).
33
Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678.
34
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
37
See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993)
(upholding tort liability for slander of title, previously unknown as a tort in West Virginia).
38
See, e.g., Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Towards Disaster: How Cleveland’s Traffic
Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 620-21 (2007) (describing
Cleveland’s speed camera enforcement ordinances).
39
See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38
(1994) (relying on several considerations to determine that the parties held in contempt “were entitled to a criminal jury trial”).
THE INNOCENT
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Even when punitive damages are in fact compensatory, as in Mathias, they may no longer be needed for complete deterrence. Judge
Posner virtually recognized this in Mathias when he validated the punitive damages award for exposing guests to bedbugs. Though he
upheld the award for corrective justice reasons, he wondered out loud
whether deterrence required it:
[I]t would have been helpful had the parties presented evidence concerning the regulatory or criminal penalties to which the defendant exposed itself by deliberately exposing its customers to a substantial risk of
being bitten by bedbugs. That is an inquiry recommended by the Supreme Court. But we do not think its omission invalidates the award.
We can take judicial notice that deliberate exposure of hotel guests to
the health risks created by insect infestations exposes the hotel’s owner
to sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate are
40
comparable in severity to the punitive damage award in this case.

III. MODERN PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PRIVATE ORDERING
The modern growth of substantial punitive awards is a product of
confusion between private and public ordering. It is arguably one
reason why four states’ supreme courts have declared that their com41
mon law of tort does not permit punitive damages. A fifth state has
42
abolished punitive damages by statute. Quite a few other states have
43
statutory caps on punitive damages. Of course, many states have no
limitation on punitive damages. Yet, in all states punitive damages
were “covertly compensatory” as in Mathias until the great torts explosion of the 1980s. Until 1976, the highest punitive damages award was

40

Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
41
See Int’l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988) (“Under Louisiana law, punitive or other ‘penalty’ damages are not allowable unless expressly authorized by statute.”); Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443
N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (“[P]unitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages contravene Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5 . . . .”); Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590
(Wash. 1996) (noting the “court’s long-standing rule prohibiting punitive damages
without express legislative authorization”); Fleshner v. Technical Commc’ns Corp., 575
N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Mass. 1991) (“Punitive damages are not allowed in this Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute.”).
42
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2009) (“No punitive damages shall be
awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute.”).
43
In my home state of Virginia, the cap is $350,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1
(2007). This is quite typical nationwide.
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44

$250,000, a sobering observation in light of recent multibillion-dollar
judgments.
Today, massive punitive damage awards in products liability and
intentional tort cases have blurred the public/private divide. Thomas
Colby has described, in a nutshell, the intellectual fog created by the
Supreme Court’s refusal to address this problem:
The obvious objection to punitive damages is that it seems clearly unconstitutional to punish a defendant with a sanction that the Supreme
Court concedes is conceptually and functionally indistinguishable from a
criminal punishment without affording the procedural safeguards that
the Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants. That objection has
plagued punitive damages for well over a century. Yet the Supreme
Court has never confronted it. Instead, the Court has consistently sidestepped the issue with the assurance that punitive damages must be constitutional because they predate the Constitution and the Framers mani45
fested no intention to displace them.

Yet, as we have seen, pre-Constitution punitive damages were qualitatively different from today’s punitive damages. Today’s punitive damages awards are usually frank exercises in public policymaking, while
pre-Constitution damages were either a product of an underdeveloped public ordering system or disguised compensation for damages
that, for historical reasons, tort law had denied.
IV. MARKEL’S MISSTEPS
Dan Markel, in two recent articles, has attempted to provide a
“principled application” of punitive damages (which he calls “retributive damages”), the lack of which was condemned by Justices Thomas
46
and Stevens in Williams. In Retributive Damages, Markel argues that
punitive damages are uniquely qualified—and should be restruc47
tured—“to advance the public’s interest in retributive justice.” In
How Should Punitive Damages Work?, Markel focuses on the nuts and

44

David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1982).
45
Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past,
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 395 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105,
131 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s “disinclination to engage the civil-criminal
gestalt”).
46
Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009)
[hereinafter Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?]; Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239
(2009) [hereinafter Markel, Retributive Damages].
47
Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 239.
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bolts of the retributive system he favors, including its procedural safe48
49
guards, effects on insurance markets, and regulation of settle50
ments. Both of Markel’s articles outline a “pragmatic form of redress
51
against anti-social misconduct” by “wealthy and powerful individuals.”
52
Markel uses yet another complicated multifactor test to determine when and within what limits punitive damages should be availa53
ble. He recommends using a percentage of the defendant’s wealth.
54
He adds suggested jury instructions as an appendix to his first article.
In the second article, he crafts a set of procedural protections for the
55
“intermediate sanction” that is punitive damages and appends
56
slightly modified jury instructions.
It should be obvious that I do not find Markel’s theoretical defense and explication of punitive damages tenable. I reject his premise that punitive damages are authorized in any but quasicompensation cases, whether to pay for moral offenses or for attor57
neys’ fees. Retributive use of punitive damages represents, to me, a
58
pollution of tort law by public ordering principles.
Though I reject Markel’s overall strategy, for those who find it palatable, I note several specific problems with several of his tactics.
48

Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1423-25.
Id. at 1463-69.
50
Id. at 1471-78.
51
Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 335. The desire to limit punitive
damages to suits against the rich is refreshingly honest, if empirically unneeded—the
poor are unlikely to be sued in tort and even less likely to have the wherewithal to pay
punitive damages.
52
For a chronicle of the rise of balancing tests in constitutional adjudication and a
critical discussion of its merits, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age
of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
53
Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 248.
54
Id. at 336-40.
55
Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1435-62.
56
Id. at 1479-84.
57
It should be noted that the portion of the Williams punitive award left to the
plaintiff, after deduction of the state’s “take,” is meant in part to compensate for legal
fees payable under the “American Rule.” See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1)(a) (2007)
(“Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party. The attorney for the prevailing
party shall be paid out of the amount allocated under this paragraph . . . .”). Clearly,
the Oregon statute recognizes that punitive awards are in part compensatory and implies that the part of the punitive award that is not compensatory does not justly belong to the victim.
58
I share the view of Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews that “the concept of a
distinct category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’ wrongs is, at its foundation, incoherent . . . .” Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 19, n.90 (2004).
49
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First, Markel’s notion that punitive damages should represent a
percentage (between 0.5% and 10%) of a defendant’s net worth—i.e.,
that wealthier defendants should pay higher punitive awards ceteris pa59
ribus—is in my opinion subject to severe Due Process problems.
Crucial both to tort law and to our understanding of equality as a
component of the rule of law, Aristotelian corrective justice holds
that, unlike liability, “sanctions [(e.g., punitive damages)] should be
based on the wrong done rather than on the status of the defen60
dant.” If a person is to be punished, it should be for what she has
done, not for who she is, even if she is a large corporation. Of course,
if tort law is meant to deter, not to correct private injustice, then some
61
have argued that the rich need greater deterrents than do the poor.
Does Markel wish to be identified with those who see tort law as quintessentially deterrent (and who therefore must make the case that
criminal law, tax law, securities law, and the other components of public law are somehow insufficiently deterrent in their combined penalties on culpable corporations)?
In any case, the use of a defendant’s net worth to help determine
punitive damages is theoretically troubling and insufficiently thought
through by Markel. As Judge Posner indicated in Mathias, net worth is
not a particularly powerful measure of a corporation’s resources. It is
essentially an accounting artifact that reflects the allocation of ownership between equity and debt claimants. A firm financed largely by
equity investors has a large net worth, while an otherwise-identical
firm “financed largely by debt may have only a small net worth be62
cause accountants treat debt as a liability.” Markel’s proposal, if implemented, would lead corporations to favor debt over equity at the
margin and to dole out more in dividends than otherwise would be
the case, so as to lower their expected outlays of punitive damages. To
my knowledge, no sound philosophical or economic reason exists to
create such an incentive. Markel hopes to avoid this problem by using
an undefined term, “net value,” to determine—along with the degree
59

See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that apportioning punitive damages to wealth “provides an open-ended
basis for inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy”); Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal,
S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Corporate size is a reason to magnify damages
only when the wrongs of larger firms are less likely to be punished; yet judges rarely
have any reason to suppose this, and the court in this case had none.”)
60
Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003).
61
See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
413, 422-23 (1992) (arguing that “wealthy defendants should be required to take more
care than less wealthy defendants” to realize society’s “optimal level of care”).
62
Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677-78.
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63

of culpability—the quantum of punitive damages for corporations.
64
But “net value,” however it is defined, is no more attractive than “net
worth,” in my opinion: why should a corporation that wastes social resources while committing evil deeds pay less in punitive damages than
a corporation whose tremendous contributions to consumer surplus
have positively affected its takeover price?
Second, Markel’s rules for dealing with criminal prosecution and
civil litigation for the same tortious behavior pose serious problems.
Markel advocates that the “intermediate sanction” of punitive damages would be credited against any fines assessed against the company,
and if a company has already been criminally convicted for relevant
conduct, such conviction would preclude any claim for punitive dam65
ages based on the underlying conduct. Obviously, Markel offers this
solution as one way to resolve the constitutional conundrum of double
jeopardy—how to prevent the defendant from “paying twice” for the
same crime? But the political machinations involved in the decision
to, for example, delay a criminal prosecution—so that the “prize” for
misbehavior can accrue to a politically favored private party and not to
the state—are too numerous and severe to contemplate seriously. Indeed, occult influence can run in both directions: one can anticipate
cases where innocent corporations anxious to avoid confiscatory punitive damages decide to plead guilty to a crime they did not commit.
How all of this is compatible with justice is anyone’s guess.
Finally, courts are utterly ill-equipped to deal effectively with the
settlement process, which they would have to supervise very closely to
prevent settlements from producing “sweetheart deals” that expand
compensatory damages and exclude punitive damages in order to defraud insurers (whose policies often exclude coverage of punitive
damages) or the state (who, like Oregon, sometimes gets a “take” of
66
punitive damages), as Markel concedes.
67
Markel counters that punitive damages should be insurable. But
would he mandate such insurance by statute? If not, there are sound
reasons related to “adverse selection” why insurers might want to exclude Markel’s punitive damages from their contractual coverage—
63

Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1400-01; Markel,
Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 288-89.
64
See id. at 289 (“With a corporation, we could look at the worth of the enterprise
as measured by valuation models used on Wall Street.”).
65
Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1458.
66
Id. at 1471-76.
67
Id. at 1477.
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higher premiums would have to be charged to corporations with large
amounts of equity, thereby exacerbating the incentive to overleverage.
CONCLUSION
Some cars require high-octane gasoline, while others need only
regular. Mid-grade gasoline, a “balanced” and “intermediate” solution, may in fact be optimal for virtually no vehicles. Such is, alas, often the fate of compromises. But mid-grade gasoline is at least nothing but a mixture of low- and high-octane fuel. The “compromise” of
“intermediate” “retributive damages” is, to the contrary, more like
mixing oil and water. It is a balance of two incommensurables—
private and public ordering. When this balancing occurs, private ordering is always the loser.
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